On many traditional theories of belief, your belief state is represented by an assignment of credences to propositions, or sets of possible worlds. If you are rational, your credence distribution will be a probability measure. Traditional theories of belief fit with a standard Bayesian theory of rational belief change: on learning a proposition, you must update your belief state by conditionalizing your credence distribution on the proposition you learn. That is, you must update by assigning 0 credence to those worlds incompatible with what you learn, and re-normalizing your credence distribution over the remaining worlds.
Following Quine 1969 , Lewis 1979 argues that we should instead represent your belief state by an assignment of credences to sets of centered worlds: world-timeindividual triples. For instance, if you have .5 credence that it is 3:00pm, your belief state should be represented by a measure that assigns .5 to the set of centered worlds with that time coordinate. Unlike traditional theories of belief, Lewis's theory does not fit with a standard Bayesian theory of rational belief change. For instance, Bayesian conditionalization preserves certainties. If you update by conditionalizing on the set of centered worlds you learn, it follows that if you are ever certain that it is 3:00pm, you must always remain certain that it is 3:00pm. But clearly this is not what rationality requires. If we agree with Lewis about how to represent belief states, we must develop another set of principles governing rational belief change.
In this paper, I develop a procedure for rationally updating credence distributions over sets of centered worlds. I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. Roughly speaking, in forming an updated credence distribution, you must first use information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and then change this hypothetical distribution to reflect information you have genuinely learned as time has passed. In making this proposal precise, I argue that your recalling information from your previous self resembles a familiar process: agents' gaining information from each other through ordinary communication.
The updating procedure I develop relies on relationships between two kinds of sets of centered worlds: de se and de dicto propositions. I will define de dicto propositions to be boring sets of centered worlds: sets of world-time-individual triples such that if one triple is in the set, so is every other triple which shares its world coordinate. De se propositions are sets of centered worlds that are not de dicto propositions. De dicto propositions are entirely about what the world is like, while de se propositions are also about where you are in the world. In §1, I introduce a claim about how de se contents of attitudes are related to de dicto propositions. In §2, I use this claim to solve a puzzle about imagination.
The discussion in §1-2 provides the foundation for a unified theory of communicating and updating beliefs. In §3, I describe how agents communicate de se beliefs.
In §4, I argue that rational updating begins with a similar process. I then describe the rest of a complete procedure for rationally updating credences in de se propositions. Finally, in §5, I apply my theory to particular cases. The last of these cases is easily handled by my theory, while presenting a problem for the theory of updating in Titelbaum 2008. This problem for Titelbaum highlights an important feature of rational updating that any successful updating procedure must recognize.
De se and de dicto contents
In giving a theory of how you should update your de se beliefs, it is helpful to understand how the contents of those beliefs are related to various de dicto propositions.
In what follows, I will argue that the following claim is theoretically and intuitively attractive: given a de se proposition, there is a de dicto proposition that is equivalent with that de se proposition, given what you believe. In more precise terms:
(proxy) Given a de se proposition, there is a de dicto proposition such that for any centered world compatible with what you believe, that centered world is in the former proposition just in case it is in the latter.
Some semantic theories of attitude ascriptions help us find de dicto propositions equivalent with contents of de se attitudes by endorsing the following claim: that speakers use first-person indexicals to self-ascribe attitudes with de dicto contents. 2 For example, suppose Kaplan sees himself in a mirror, without realizing that he is seeing himself. Looking at the mirror, Kaplan sees that his pants are on fire, without realizing that his own pants are on fire. In recounting his experience, suppose Kaplan says:
(1) I expected that I would be rescued.
Kaplan can truly utter (1), even though he was not aware of being in danger when he looked at the mirror. In this respect, (1) differs from (2):
(2) I expected to be rescued.
Unlike (1), reports such as (2) are true only if the ascribee has a self-directed attitude.
Here is one useful explanation of this contrast: reports such as (2) ascribe attitudes with de se contents, while reports such as (1) ascribe attitudes with de dicto contents. 3
The content of the expectation ascribed by (2) is a set of centered worlds where the center is rescued. But the content of the expectation ascribed by (1) is a set of centered worlds that is characterized not by any property of the center, but by some property of the person Kaplan sees. Since (1) and (2) ascribe expectations with different contents, these ascriptions can have different truth conditions. This semantic account of the contrast between (1) and (2) fits well with (proxy).
Suppose that (1) ascribes a de dicto attitude while (2) ascribes a de se attitude. Kaplan believes that the person he sees is not himself, so the content of the attitude that (1) ascribes is not equivalent with the content of the attitude that (2) ascribes, given what he believes. But normally when a speaker utters (1) and (2), the content of the de dicto attitude that (1) ascribes will be equivalent with the content of the de se attitude that (2) ascribes, given what she believes. These contents will still be distinct propositions. In particular, only one will be a de se proposition. But in normal cases, the centered worlds at which the contents differ in truth value will not be among the centered worlds compatible with what the speaker believes.
In other words: even in normal cases with no identity confusion, you have a third-personal way of thinking about yourself. On the semantic account just sketched, this way of thinking about yourself gives rise to de dicto attitudes that you use first- given what he believes with certainty.
To sum up so far: the de se expectation that Kaplan ascribes using (5) is not equivalent with the expectations he ascribes using (6) and (7), given what he believes with certainty:
(5) I expect to be rescued.
(6) I expect that the man whose pants are on fire will be rescued.
(7) I expect that David Kaplan will be rescued. Suppose that it is 3:00 and you are teaching class, and while you are teaching, I ask you to imagine that it is 5:00. There are two very different ways you might respond.
For instance, you might play along by saying either of the following:
(9) Then I am in my kitchen, starting to make dinner.
(10) Then my watch is wrong, and all of us must be strangely confused to be here so much later than usual.
Once you decide to respond in one of these ways, it is clear how you should go on with what you are imagining. Either you imagine that two hours have passed and your day has proceeded normally, or you imagine that someone has played a practical joke on you and your students. These responses involve very different kinds of imaginary scenarios. The acceptability of either response raises a puzzle:
what distinguishes these two ways of imagining that it is 5:00?
In both cases, when I ask you to imagine that it is 5:00, you comply by imagining where you imagine as in (9), you not only imagine the de se proposition that it is 5:00, but also the de dicto proposition that a certain time is 3:00. In the case of (10) proposition that a certain time is 3:00 holds in all these worlds.
Our natural responses to (9) and (10) support my characterization of the difference between these ways of imagining. For instance, it is natural to say that when you accept (9), you are imagining that some time has passed. If you are imagining that the actual current time has already passed, you may freely imagine that it is 5:00, while imagining that you correctly identified the actual current time as 3:00. In this case, your de dicto belief that a certain time is 3:00 is true at worlds compatible with what you imagine. By contrast, it is natural to say that when you accept (10), you are imagining that the actual current time is not what you thought it was. In this case, your de dicto belief that a certain time is 3:00 is not true at worlds compatible with what you imagine.
The same puzzle arises for several attitudes besides imagining. For example, there are two natural ways to suppose the de se proposition that it is 5:00, corresponding to two indicative conditionals:
(11) If it is 5:00, then I am in my kitchen, starting to make dinner.
(12) If it is 5:00, then my watch is wrong, and all of us must be strangely confused to be here so much later than usual.
Here the puzzle is to say why both of these very different conditionals can be acceptable. Let us agree with Ramsey 1931 that 'if p, would q' is acceptable to those who accept q after "adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge" (248). Both (11) and (12) can be acceptable because there are different ways to add the de se proposition that it is 5:00 to your stock of knowledge. In particular, as you suppose that it is 5:00, you may or may not continue to accept the de dicto proposition that a certain time is 3:00. If you retain your de dicto belief, you will accept the consequent of (11).
If you give up your de dicto belief, you will accept the consequent of (12).
So far I have distinguished ways of imagining and supposing centered contents.
The distinctions I have drawn are related to the distinction between belief updating and belief revision often cited in literature on de se belief change. 5 In order to accept the consequent of (11), you must update on the antecedent as if some time had passed. In order to accept the consequent of (12), you must instead revise your current beliefs. In both updating and revising, you give up some de se beliefs. Updating and revising are distinguished by whether you also give up certain de dicto beliefs that your old de se beliefs were equivalent with. If you retain your de dicto beliefs, you are updating. If you give them up, you are revising.
Retaining de dicto beliefs equivalent with your de se beliefs is what unifies several attitudes: imagining as in (9), supposing as in (11), and updating rather than revising.
I hope to have forestalled the objection that your de dicto belief that a certain time is 3:00 is trivial, by arguing that whether you retain such de dicto beliefs grounds substantive differences in ways of imagining and supposing propositions. I also hope to have forestalled the objection that your belief that a certain time is 3:00 is really a de se belief, since you imagine the same de se contents in (9) and (10) In hypothetical black box updating, you form beliefs on the basis of information you get from your previous self. Getting information from your previous self is just like getting information from other agents. Each de se proposition you used to believe is equivalent with some de dicto proposition, given what you used to believe with certainty. This sort of de dicto proposition is something you can currently believe. Furthermore, you currently have some de se beliefs about your relation to your previous self. So you can also currently believe some de se propositions: the consequences of your current de se beliefs and your old de dicto information.
7. For readers looking for a more conciliatory approach: one may simply restrict (proxy) to agents that can have de dicto thoughts about themselves and their temporal location. The resulting theory of updating is still substantial in scope.
Suppose you used to believe a de se proposition: that it was the fourth of the month. This proposition is equivalent with some de dicto proposition, given what you used to believe with certainty. This sort of de dicto proposition is something you can currently believe. Furthermore, you currently have some de se beliefs about your relation to your previous self, e.g. that your current self is located one day later. So you can also currently believe a de se proposition: that it is the fifth of the month.
Just as an agent may have certain de se beliefs once she acquires de dicto beliefs from other agents, you may have certain de se beliefs once you recall the de dicto beliefs of your previous self.
Genuine rational updating happens in two steps. First you update as if you were in a black box. Then you conditionalize your resulting credences on what you genuinely learn. I have just described the first step of updating. In order to describe a more complete updating procedure, I will point out three respects in which the story so far has been idealized, and I will say how these idealizations can be removed.
Credences
So far I have talked about modifying beliefs, rather than credence distributions. But my aim is to develop a general theory of how agents maintain and modify credences. proposition: that it was the fourth of the month. Given what you used to believe with certainty, this proposition is equivalent with some de dicto proposition, to which you also gave .9 credence if your credences were probabilistically coherent. If you are updating in a black box, you should currently give .9 credence to that same de dicto proposition.
Black box updating is like communication: it as if your previous self could talk to you and thereby propose constraints on your de dicto credences. Only unlike cases of real communication, there is no limit to the amount of information your previous self can convey. It is as if your previous self proposes that your current de dicto credences satisfy every constraint that they did before. So in a hypothetical black box updating case, a case where no genuine learning occurs, all of your de dicto credences should stay just the same.
Conditional credences about your relation to your previous self
So far when talking about how your previous de dicto beliefs should influence your current de se beliefs, I have talked about your beliefs about your relation to your previous self. But in fact you have more complicated opinions about your relation to your previous self. In particular, your credences about how much time has passed between you and your previous self are conditional in nature. For example, suppose you recently looked at a clock that read 2:00, but you think the clock may be an hour slow. Suppose you also know that time passes more quickly as the afternoon wears on. Then you might currently believe that if it was indeed 2:00 earlier, four minutes have passed since you looked at the clock. But if it was 3:00, five or six minutes may have passed. In this way, your opinions about how much time has passed are conditional credences. They are conditional on de dicto propositions, such as the de dicto proposition you would have used 'it is 2:00' to convey when you were looking at the clock.
In practice, your opinions about your relation to your previous self are given by conditional credence distributions. Earlier your de dicto credences were defined on an algebra generated by some partition of atomic de dicto propositions. For any such de dicto proposition, you have a credence distribution over de se propositions, given that de dicto proposition. For example, conditional on your having looked at the clock at 3:00, you may give .5 credence to five minutes having passed and .5 credence to six minutes having passed. Conditional credence distributions like these are more precise models of your opinions about your relative location in time.
In black box updating, your credences are entirely determined by two elements:
your previous credences in de dicto propositions, and your current conditional cre-dences about your relation to your previous self. First your previous credences determine how much credence you give to any given de dicto proposition. Then your conditional credences determine how you distribute that credence among all de se propositions entailing that de dicto proposition. 9 This uniquely determines a credence distribution over both de dicto and de se propositions. If your previous opinions and your innate sense of time passing were your only sources of information, your rationally updated credences would be determined in just this way.
Genuine learning
Once we understand how you should update in a black box case, describing a complete procedure for rational updating is straightforward. In ordinary cases, your later to your previous self, your previous de dicto credences may constrain your current de se credences in just the same way. The second step of updating is simply conditionalizing on what you learn. In a sense, we have found that conditionalization is 9. Over time, your de dicto credences are defined over an increasingly fine-grained algebra, as you come to assign credence to de dicto propositions equivalent with the contents of your later de se attitudes. So when you distribute credence among de se propositions, you are effectively also distributing credence among the de dicto propositions that are equivalent with those de se propositions, given what your later self believes.
the correct procedure for updating de se credences. It is just that we must be careful that we are conditionalizing the correct object on what you learn: not your previous credences, but a hypothetical modification of them. The theory of updating I defend is more modest than some alternative theories.
I accept the information you get from your previous self as a primitive input in updating. Since I have not given a general prescription for generating this information, my theory is best understood as a framework within which more detailed updating procedures can be developed. I also accept as primitive the distinction between information you gain from your sense of time passing, and genuinely learned information. Fortunately, we have sufficient intuitive grasp of this distinction for my theory to issue verdicts about particular cases, and I can argue for my theory on the grounds that it yields better verdicts about such cases than competing theories.
Other theories of updating generally do not distinguish the kinds of constraints on credences that are inputs to updating. In particular, other theories generally do not recognize information you gain from your sense of time passing as a primitive input to an updating procedure. They simply accept as an input that your later self meets certain conditions, such as being certain of the de se proposition that it is 5:00, without recording whether you arrived at this certainty by getting additional evidence or by independently keeping track of how much time had passed. For instance, Titelbaum 2008 calls the inputs to his updating procedure "extrasystematic constraints," and says only that they "represent rational requirements derived from the specific details of the story being modeled" (560).
In order to illustrate how my theory works and how it differs from less modest theories, I will conclude by discussing one more case in detail. Other theories have more trouble yielding this verdict. Titelbaum 2008 gives a theory that is similar to mine in some respects. But the mermaid case presents a problem for Titelbaum. This problem is useful: it distinguishes Titelbaum's theory from mine, and illustrates the importance of distinguishing the kinds of constraints on credences that are inputs to updating. Titelbaum starts by endorsing a limited version of conditionalization that applies to any sort of algebra P over which your credences are defined:
(lc) If you do not become uncertain of any proposition in P, then update your credence distribution over P by conditionalizing on the strongest proposition in P of which you become certain.
As Titelbaum recognizes, (lc) has counterintuitive verdicts. In particular, when you wake up in the mermaid case, you immediately learn that it is not Sunday. So you do not lose certainty in any proposition in the algebra (p1) generated by the following de se propositions: The real problem for Titelbaum arises because the qualified (lc) does not entail the right verdict about the mermaid case, either. Titelbaum does not address this problem in detail, but the following remarks contain his proposed solution:
If the modeling language of M + . . . contains context-insensitive truth-value equivalents for each context-sensitive sentence at each time in the time set -we can construct a reduction of M + different from M whose language represents only the context-insensitive claims represented in M + . This model will yield diachronic verdicts by (lc), and since it is a proper reduction of M + those verdicts can be exported back to M + by (pe). (579) Here is my reconstruction of how Titelbaum aims to derive the correct verdict about how you should update in the mermaid case. In the mermaid case, your credences are defined over algebras generated by the following propositions: (p3) is a proper expansion of (p2) in the following sense: for every (p3) proposition, you can always find some (p2) proposition such that you are certain that it has the same truth value as that (p3) proposition. Titelbaum endorses the following principle:
(pe) If rationality constrains your credence distribution over P, and P is a proper expansion of P for you, then update your credence distribution over P according to the same constraints.
And so it appears that Titelbaum can derive the correct verdict about the mermaid case. 14 First, note that on waking, you do not lose certainty in any proposition in (p2). So (lc) says that you should update your credence distribution over (p2) by conditionalizing on the information you learn, namely that either it was Thursday or it was Friday when you went to sleep. On the first day, you started with 1 / 4 credence that it was Thursday and 1 / 4 credence that it was Friday. So after conditionalizing, you should have 1 / 2 credence that it was Thursday. Second, since (p3) is a proper expansion of (p2), (pe) says that you should update your credence distribution over (p3) in the same way, by coming to have 1 / 2 credence that it was Thursday, and hence 1 / 2 credence that it is Friday. Finally, Titelbaum's modeling rule entails that since (p3) is an expansion of (p1), you should also update your credence distribution over (p1)
by coming to have 1 / 2 credence that it is Friday.
The problem with this chain of reasoning is that it works in both directions. If the above reasoning is acceptable, then we should also be able to reason as follows:
by (lc), you should update your credence distribution over (p1) by coming to have 1 / 3 credence that it is Friday. Since (p3) is a proper expansion of (p1), (pe) says that you should update your credence distribution over (p3) in the same way. Hence you should update your credence distribution over (p3) by coming to have 1 / 3 credence that it was Thursday. By the modeling rule, you should update your credence distribution over (p2) in the same way. Hence you should update your credence distribution over (p2) by coming to have 1 / 3 credence that it was Thursday and 2 / 3 credence that it was Friday, rather than becoming equally confident of these propositions.
As far as Titelbaum's theory is concerned, the algebras (p1) and (p2) stand in symmetric relations to the larger algebra (p3). So Titelbaum faces a dilemma. If (lc) applies to your credence distribution over (p2), then it should apply to your credence distribution over (p1), and (lc) will yield the wrong verdict about how to update that credence distribution. But if (lc) does not apply to your credence distribution over (p2), then Titelbaum cannot use its verdict about (p2) to derive the right verdict about how to update your credence distribution over (p1). Titelbaum has not demonstrated that he can prevent (lc) from generating counterintuitive consequences, without also preventing (lc) from generating the right verdicts about updating in particular cases.
This problem with his theory is very wide in scope. In any natural case of updating, you will lose your certainty that some small amount of time has not passed. So the unqualified version of (lc) will not apply to your entire credence distribution.
Instead we must always figure out how constraints on coarser credences to which (lc) applies will induce constraints on your real credences. If we do not know which coarser credences are relevant to constraining your real credences, there will be no
way to say what your real credences should be. 
